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O ne hundred and ninety participants (95 undergraduates and 95 employees) responded to a factorial surveyin which a number of case-based organizational allocation tasks were described. Participants were asked to
imagine themselves as employees in fictitious organizations and chose among three allocations of employee-
development schemes invested by the manager in different work groups. The allocations regarded how such
investments should be allocated between two parties. Participants chose twice, once picking the fairest and once
the best allocation. One between-subjects factor varied whether the parties represented social (i.e., choosing
among allocations between two different work groups) or temporal comparisons (i.e., choosing among
allocations between the present and the following year). Another between-subjects factor varied whether
participants’ in-group was represented by the parties or not. One allocation maximized the outcome to one party,
another maximized the joint outcome received by both parties, and a third provided both parties with equal but
lower outcomes. It was predicted that equality, although always deficient to both parties, would be the preferred
allocation when parties represented social comparisons and when choices were based on fairness. When parties
represented temporal comparisons, and when choices were based on preference, maximizing the joint outcome
was hypothesized to be the preferred allocation. Results supported these hypotheses. Against what was predicted,
whether the in-group was represented by the parties or not did not moderate the results, indicating that
participants’ allocation preferences were not affected by self-interest. The main message is that people make
sensible distinctions between what they prefer and what they regard as fair. The results were the same for
participating students who imagined themselves as being employees and participants who were true employees,
suggesting that no serious threats to external validity are committed when university students are used as
participants.
C ent quatre-vingt-dix participants (95 e´tudiants universitaires et 95 employe´s) ont re´pondu a` une enqueˆtefactorielle dans laquelle un certain nombre de taˆches d’allocation de nature organisationnelle e´taient
de´crites. Les participants devaient s’imaginer eux-meˆmes en tant qu’employe´s dans des entreprises fictives et
choisir parmi trois allocations repre´sentant des sche`mes d’investissement employe´s-de´veloppement effectue´s par
le directeur dans diffe´rents groupes de travail. Les allocations tenaient compte de la fac¸on dont les investissements
devaient eˆtre attribue´s entre deux partis. Les participants ont choisi deux fois, une premie`re fois en regard de ce
qui leur apparaissait le plus juste et une autre fois en regard de ce qui leur semblait le mieux. Un facteur
intergroupe variait selon que les partis repre´sentaient des comparaisons sociales (c.-a`-d. choisir parmi des
allocations a` distribuer entre deux groupes de travail diffe´rents) ou temporelles (c.-a`-d. choisir parmi des
allocations a` distribuer entre le pre´sent et l’anne´e a` venir). Un autre facteur intergroupe variait selon que
l’endogroupe e´tait repre´sente´ par les partis ou non. Une allocation be´ne´ficiait a` un parti, une autre favorisait
conjointement les deux partis et une troisie`me be´ne´ficiait e´galement aux deux partis, mais dans une moindre
mesure. Il e´tait pre´dit que l’e´galite´, quoique toujours de´ficiente pour les deux partis, serait l’allocation pre´fe´re´e
quand les partis repre´sentaient des comparaisons sociales et quand les choix e´taient base´s sur la justice. Quand les
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partis repre´sentaient des comparaisons temporelles et quand les choix e´taient base´s sur la pre´fe´rence, il e´tait
attendu que l’allocation pre´fe´re´e serait le be´ne´fice conjoint. Les re´sultats ont soutenu ces hypothe`ses.
Contrairement a` ce qui e´tait attendu, le fait que l’endogroupe soit repre´sente´ par les partis ou non n’a pas mode´re´
les re´sultats, indiquant que les pre´fe´rences d’allocation des participants n’e´taient pas affecte´es par leurs inte´reˆts
personnels. Le message principal est que les gens font des distinctions sensibles entre ce qu’ils pre´fe`rent et ce qu’ils
croient eˆtre juste. Les re´sultats ont e´te´ les meˆmes pour les participants e´tudiants qui s’imaginaient en tant
qu’employe´s et les participants qui e´taient de re´els employe´s, sugge´rant qu’aucune menace se´rieuse a` la validite´
externe n’a e´te´ commise en utilisant des e´tudiants universitaires comme participants.
C ientonoventa participantes (95 estudiantes universitarios y 95 empleados) respondieron un cuestionariofactorial en el que se describı´an una serie de tareas de asignaciones organizacionales basadas en casos. Se
pidio´ a los participantes que se imaginaran a ellos mismos como empleados en organizaciones ficticias y que
escogieran entre tres asignaciones de esquemas de desarrollo para trabajadores, las cuales eran utilizadas por el
gerente en diferentes grupos de trabajo. Las asignaciones consideraron co´mo tales inversiones se distribuirı´an
entre dos partidos. Los participantes tuvieron la posibilidad de escoger dos veces, una, tomando en consideracio´n
la asignacio´n ma´s justa, y otra, considerando la mejor asignacio´n. Uno de los factores de relacio´n entre sujetos
variaba si los grupos empleaban comparaciones sociales (p.e., escoger entre asignaciones en relacio´n a dos
diferentes grupos de trabajo) o temporales (p.e., escoger entre asignaciones correspondientes al an˜o presente o al
venidero). Otro factor de relacio´n entre sujetos variaba si los participantes en el grupo eran representados por el
partido o no. Mientras que una asignacio´n maximizo´ los resultados de un partido, la otra maximizo´ los
resultados conjuntos recibidos por ambas partes y la tercera posicio´n proporciono´ a ambos partidos resultados
iguales pero bajos. Se predijo que, la igualdad, aunque siempre deficiente para ambas partes, serı´a la asignacio´n
preferida cuando los partidos utilizaban comparaciones sociales y las elecciones se basaban en lo justo. Cuando
los partidos empleaban comparaciones temporales, y las elecciones se basaron en preferencias, se hipotetizo´ que
la maximizacio´n de los resultados conjuntos serı´a la asignacio´n preferida. Los resultados apoyaron estas
hipo´tesis. En contra de lo predicho, si la experiencia intragrupal fue representada o no por los partidos no afecto´
a los resultados, indicando que las preferencias de asignacio´n de los participantes no fueron afectadas por el
propio intere´s. El mensaje ma´s importante de este estudio es que las personas hacen una sensible distincio´n entre
lo que prefieren y lo que consideran justo. Los resultados fueron los mismos en estudiantes que participaron en el
estudio y se imaginaron a sı´ mismos como siendo empleados y participantes que eran realmente empleados,
sugiriendo que no hay amenazas serias para la validez externa cuando estudiantes universitarios son utilizados
como participantes.
When people in groups allocate resources between
members of their group, they most often consider
equal allocations to be fairest and, therefore,
choose to give equal shares to all group members
when possible (e.g., Allison & Messick, 1990). This
is especially true when inputs from group members
do not differ. In such circumstances, equality
coincides with equity, suggesting that a resource
should be allocated proportionally to inputs
(Adams, 1965). However, people often still choose
to allocate resources equally even when inputs
differ (e.g., Messick & Schell, 1992) and when
alternative allocations would be more beneficial to
all (Eek & Ga¨rling, 2006; Selart & Eek, 2005).
Thus, it is fair to say that splitting resources
equally is an often-used method of allocation and
that equality sometimes qualifies as some form of
heuristic or shallow process (for a review, see
Selart & Eek, 1999).
In this article we present an experimental study
demonstrating that choices of allocation principle
depend to a large extent on the dimension that is
used as the criterion for the evaluation. As an
example, fair principles for allocation differ quite
dramatically from preferred allocation principles.
Furthermore, equality is often preferred even
though utility is not maximized as prescribed by
decision theory (e.g., Von Neuman &
Morgenstern, 1947). Hence, the main purpose of
our study is to make as transparent as possible the
environmental circumstances under which equality
dominates as a principle. It is argued that
contextual dimensions, such as type of comparison
(social/temporal), in-group representation (in-
group/out-group), and response mode (fairest/
most preferred option), explain whether or not
equality dominates. The perspective taken is that
social decision behaviour is context dependent and
that preference is constructed in the decision
situation (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993;
Selart, 1996; Selart & Eek, 1999). We argue that
equality in certain contexts may be chosen as a
result of fairness perceptions and not necessarily as
a result of simplicity. We also argue that con-
textual factors are able to evoke reasons that
provoke individuals to reason based more on
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maximization or self-interest, thus establishing
preference structures that depart from equality.
Equality and other allocation principles
Equality prescribes equal shares to all recipients
and an abundance of previous research has been
devoted to providing answers to why this principle
is endorsed so often (for reviews see, e.g., Messick,
1993, 1995). Several interesting and important
conclusions can be inferred. For instance, in line
with what was first theorized by Deutsch (1975),
equality is the dominating allocation principle
when people have social concern as the goal of
their interaction (e.g., Kazemi, Eek, & Ga¨rling,
2005a, b; Selart & Eek, 2005). One reason is that
equality stresses the cooperative aspects of a
relationship between status-equals. In contrast,
the equity principle (e.g., Adams, 1965) stresses
competitive aspects among members of a collective
(e.g., Sampson, 1975). Diekman, Samuels, Ross,
and Bazerman (1997) argued that it may be the
particular value of signalling equal status among
people that often turns equality into the most
preferred allocation principle.
Equality is also an appealing solution, since
deviations from equality often seem to produce
greater displeasure in participants who achieve less
than they produce pleasure in participants who
achieve more (Messick & Sentis, 1985). In a similar
line of reasoning, it is argued that equality serves
as an ‘‘anchor’’ that defines the minimum people
will take when dividing a resource. People only
deviate from such anchors when there are certain
conditions present, such as ambiguity about
division criteria or others’ contributions, or a
resource pool that is difficult to divide equally
(Allison & Messick, 1990; Messick, 1995;
Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992).
Despite the many advantages of the equality
principle, it is still only one among several
allocation principles. When there are goals other
than social concern, other principles may serve
better. Sampson (1975) argued that equality and
equity are the two major solutions to distributive
problems in economic and other spheres of life.
These solutions vary considerably in their under-
standing of the conditions appropriate to create
harmony, cohesion, and justice. Deutsch (1975)
offered a similar categorization of rules determin-
ing fair allocations, equity, equality, and need, and
suggested that each of the principles favours a
certain goal of a relationship (cf. Kazemi et al.,
2005a, b; Lane, 1986; Mannix, Neale, &
Northcraft, 1995). Thus, allocations according to
equality, equity, or need capture what most people
consider fair, and which principle is chosen in the
end is largely dependent on the goal or purpose of
the allocation.
The present study focuses on factors moderating
the implementation of equality. We do not
compare equality to equity and need, but to
allocation strategies that are more beneficial for
all in that they provide all parties with larger
shares than equality. Equality has two advantages
in addition to those reviewed above; it is both fair
and simple. The distinction between the fairness
and the simplicity aspects of the implementation of
equality has been debated in previous research.
Even though equality most often is a cognitively
simple strategy, easily understood by everyone,
and quickly implemented (Messick & Schell, 1992;
Roch, Lane, Samuelson, Allison, & Dent, 2000),
research has shown that it is also implemented
when it requires extensive calculations (e.g., Van
Dijk & Wilke, 1995). Equality is often known as
one of many decision heuristics used in people’s
everyday life. Such heuristics are not the results of
careful deliberations; they are merely rules-of-
thumb (Allison & Messick, 1990).
Deutsch (1975) noted that different goals may
conflict with one another. An example is the
problem that equality may not maximize the
common good. Sometimes, a principle other than
equality is a collectively better choice in that some,
or even all, would receive more by its implementa-
tion. Still, as demonstrated by Eek and Ga¨rling
(2006), equality is often preferred even though
there are other principles that are more beneficial
to all. Based on these results, we argue that
equality is chosen so frequently because it satisfies
people’s fairness concerns, and not because of
simplicity. Furthermore, we test this assumption in
two ways. First, we ask participants to choose the
fairest among several allocations and compare it to
the same participants’ choices of the best alloca-
tion. By asking the same participants to choose the
best and the fairest allocation, respectively, we
could directly test whether fairness considerations
dictate choices of equality. Second, by comparing
conditions where issues of fairness are clearly
relevant to conditions where fairness is less
relevant, we could also test the explanation in a
more subtle way. Hence, we hypothesized that
fairness is only relevant when social comparisons
are possible. In one condition we asked partici-
pants to allocate resources between two groups. In
another condition, we asked participants to
allocate the same resources within one group at
different points in time (i.e., a ‘‘temporal compar-
ison’’).
CHOOSING BETWEEN ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES 111
In the study, participants in organizational
settings chose between equality and other alloca-
tion principles that, compared to equality, were
more beneficial to all parties. If equality is a
heuristic, participants should choose equality
irrespective of what kind of comparisons they
make, and irrespective of whether they choose the
best or the fairest allocation. In contrast, if choices
of equality are explained by fairness considera-
tions, participants should only choose equality
when fairness becomes relevant through social
comparisons.
Factors influencing evaluations of outcomes
In research on outcome evaluations there has been
a discussion about different judgment or evalua-
tion dimensions (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996;
Van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, & Vermunt, 1998). An
evaluator may judge an outcome in terms of
fairness, but also in terms of preference. It has
been argued that these evaluation dimensions
(fairness vs preference) can be equated because
some research has shown that they often converge
in people’s minds. Outcome fairness refers to the
legitimacy of the outcome in relation to the
prevailing definition of justice. Outcome preference
refers to the extent of material benefit in the
outcome being judged. Van den Bos et al.
demonstrated that fairness and preference judg-
ments do indeed differ. In the present study, we
deliberately separated the two dimensions of
evaluations with the aim of investigating whether
certain allocation principles are chosen primarily
out of fairness or out of preference.
Since it has been known for a long time that
evaluations largely depend on standards or refer-
ents, researchers in the area of outcome evalua-
tions have also theorized in terms of reference
points (e.g., Van den Bos et al., 1998). Norms are
evoked by the decision context and subsequently
used as reference points in the evaluation process
(Boles & Messick, 1995). One important such
reference point in the process of evaluating
outcome fairness is what comparisons are being
made. Equity theory is based on the idea that
others’ outcomes are important to a person who
evaluates his or her own outcome. It has been
shown that outcomes are judged as fairer and
better when they are equal to, as opposed to
different from, outcomes received by others
(Messick & Sentis, 1983). Van den Bos et al.
(1998) draw a distinction between what is implied
by social comparisons and other reference
points such as, for instance, expectations: Social
comparisons are more directly connected to fair-
ness judgments, and this, in turn, may reveal a
difference between evaluations of fairness and
evaluations of preference. Another aim of the
present study was to investigate the effect of
nature of comparison on fairness and preference
evaluations.
The design of the present study
Participants were asked to imagine that they were
members of a work group at a fictitious company
where the managers planned to invest money for
various employee-development schemes. The par-
ticipants’ task was to choose between different
allocations of the money invested. For some
groups of participants, the parties of the alloca-
tions made social comparisons possible. For other
groups, temporal comparisons were present
instead. Our focus was to study which allocation
participants preferred under the different compar-
isons. We expected that fairness issues should be
more relevant for the former groups, and that
participants therefore should choose equality,
whereas participants in the latter groups were
expected to choose an allocation that was more
beneficial.
Given that choices between allocation principles
partly depend on self-interest (e.g., Wilke, 1991),
another factor that we assumed would moderate
participants’ choices was whether or not their own
group was represented by the receiving parties.
Equality might be chosen as the best principle
between other parties, but not as much when one is
a member of one of the receiving parties. Thus,
participants allocating money between their own
work group (i.e., in-group) and another work
group (i.e., out-group) should choose different
principles from participants distributing money
between two out-groups. In similar experiments,
Selart and Eek (2005) showed that no matter if the
own or the neighbouring municipality gain was
prominent, both groups preferred equality.
However, it was also shown that pro-self motives
based on group identity mattered a lot in explain-
ing preferences for other alternatives that
favoured the in-group to different degrees. For
instance, systematically giving inappropriately
large shares (i.e., overweighting biases) was more
easily observed when pro-self motives based
on group identity were present than when pro-
other motives were present. It may therefore
be hypothesized that self-interest related to the
in-group would moderate participants’ choices.
Features like in-group interest, in-group
112 EEK AND SELART
based goals, and in-group favouritism may play a
part in this.
The allocation principles. In addition to an
equality alternative (e.g., 2950 for own group and
2950 for the other group), participants chose from
a maximization alternative that maximized the
jointly invested money and provided both parties
with more money than the equality alternative
(e.g., 3190/3450) and an own-best alternative that
maximized the money invested in one of the
parties and gave less to the other, but still provided
both parties with more money than the equality
alternative (e.g., 3500/3000). A fourth allocation
alternative that gave a lot more to one of the
parties (90% of the sum of the equal alternative)
and very little to the other (the remaining 10%)
(e.g., 590/5310) was also included. However, given
that hardly any participants ever chose this
alternative, it was excluded from the analyses.
Hypotheses. In sum, the focus of the present
study was to investigate under what circumstances
equality is chosen as the allocation principle. The
aims were to (1) investigate what allocation
principles are chosen when choices are based on
fairness and what principles are chosen when
choices are based on preference, and to investigate
(2) the moderating effect of nature of comparison,
and (iii) the moderating effect of self-interest. With
regard to evaluation dimension, we hypothesized
that participants generally would prefer equality
when asked to choose the fairest allocation (H1a),
and maximization when asked to choose the best
allocation (H1b). In contrast to making a choice
based on fairness, a request for a preference
judgment evokes reasoning based on self-interest
to a higher extent. Therefore, participants were
hypothesized to opt for a maximization of out-
comes. We also expected an interaction effect
between nature of comparison and allocation
principle such that equality would be chosen when
the allocation event included social comparisons
(H2a), and that maximization would be chosen
when the allocation event included temporal
comparisons (H2b). The reason is simply that
fairness makes no sense when temporal compar-
isons are made salient. Finally, we expected an
effect of self-interest in that the own-best allocation
would be chosen as the best allocation when the
allocation event included the in-group and when
social comparisons were made salient (H3a). When
only out-groups were included in the allocation
event, self-interest has no role, and as a result we
hypothesized that equality then would be chosen as
the fairest allocation (H3b).
Finally, although it was not the main interest in
the study to generalize the results to real-life
settings, in order to increase the external validity,
we included two different groups of participants.
Apart from undergraduates, who are commonly
used as participants, we also recruited employees
from various private companies. Should the effects
of the manipulated factors be the same for
undergraduates as for employees, it would indicate
that research questions identified in organizational
settings can be meaningfully studied under con-
trolled settings in the laboratory.
METHOD
Participants and design
Ninety-five undergraduates (46 psychology under-
graduates with a mean age of 27.2 years and 49
business school undergraduates with a mean age of
24.7 years) and 95 employees (mean age 5 34.9
years) at different companies participated in the
experiment. Among the psychology undergradu-
ates, 22 were women and 24 were men; among the
business school undergraduates, 25 were women
and 24 were men; and among the employees, 46
were women and 49 were men. All undergraduates
had completed at least two semesters of their
educational programs. Participants were randomly
assigned to one condition in a 2 (Group: in-group
vs out-group) 6 2 (Comparison: social vs tem-
poral) factorial design.
Materials
In a questionnaire, each participant was asked to
imagine that he or she was a member of a work
group at a fictitious company. In order to increase
the competence within its staff, the managers of
the company planned to invest money for various
employee-development schemes for the different
work groups. The task for participants was to
choose between three different allocations (A, B,
or C) of such investments.
Two between-subjects factors regarded the
parties of these allocations. One factor, group,
operationalized self-interest by informing partici-
pants in the in-group conditions that their own
group was represented by one of the two parties in
the allocation task. For instance, the instructions
to the allocation tasks in the in-group conditions
read (translated from the Swedish): ‘‘Your group
and another group will both receive money for
employee-development schemes. Among the allo-
cations below, choose the one that you think is the
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fairest/best.’’ An example of the different alloca-
tions to choose from is:
Alternative A is the own-best alternative, B is the
maximization alternative, and C is the equality
alternative. Equality provided both parties an
equal split of 90% of the joint outcome of the
own-best alternative. Equality was thus deficient
both to maximization and own-best, which was
necessary to test the hypotheses.
In order to test the hypotheses, maximization
and own-best needed to be distinguishable with
regard to self-interest. That is, if both parties
would be better off by maximization as compared
to own-best, a choice based on self-interest would
be confounded with a choice based on collective
rationality. Therefore, own-best needed to provide
the in-group with more money than maximization,
but both groups overall with less money than
maximization. A second necessary condition for
maximization not to be confounded with self-
interest is that maximization and own-best overall
should appear equally good. Therefore, using
another 36 psychology and 36 business school
undergraduates as participants in a pilot study, the
own-best and maximization alternatives were
matched to appear equally attractive. In the pilot
study, one figure out of four was left out and
participants’ task was to fill in the missing figure
and thereby render the two alternatives equally
attractive (i.e., ‘‘Fill in the missing figure so that
you think that alternatives A and B are overall
equally good’’). For the above example of alloca-
tions, participants in the pilot study were asked to
make alternatives A and B equally attractive by
filling in the missing figure in the following
example:
Participants’ mean rating for each task (i.e.,
3190 in the example above) was used in the present
experimental material. The pilot study also used a
2 (Group: in-group vs out-group) 6 2
(Comparison: social vs temporal) between-subjects
factorial design. Since no statistical differences
were found between the groups in the pilot study,
the overall prominent means were used in the main
study.
In the out-group conditions, two out-groups
were represented by the parties (i.e., ‘‘Your
previous work group and another group will both
receive money for employee-development schemes.
Among the allocations below, choose …’’).
The other between-subjects factor, comparison,
regarded the nature of comparison made in the
allocation tasks. For the social conditions, social
comparisons were made in that money was
allocated between two different groups, as in the
examples above. In the temporal conditions,
money was allocated between the present and the
next year. For instance, in the in-group condition
with temporal comparison, the instructions read:
‘‘Your group will receive money for employee-
development schemes both the present year and
the next year. Among the allocations below,
choose the one that you think is the fairest/best.’’
Thus, the label of the first line in the tasks
exemplified above was replaced with ‘‘SEK per
year and employee in your group for the present
year’’ and the second line was replaced with ‘‘SEK
per year and employee in your group for the next
year.’’ In the out-group condition with temporal
comparison, the same instructions were given
except that ‘‘your group’’ was exchanged with
‘‘other group.’’
For each task (i.e., each page in the question-
naire), half of the participants were first asked to
indicate which allocation (A, B, or C) they
perceived as the fairest one. Thereafter, they were
asked to indicate which allocation they perceived
to be the best (most preferred) one. The other half
of participants made these choices in the reverse
order. All participants completed a total of 12
replication tasks, resulting in 24 choice responses
for each participant. The 12 tasks held the
differences between the three allocations (own-
best, maximization, and equality) constant and, as
such, constituted different numerical representa-
tions of the three allocation alternatives. The
allocations were counterbalanced to the labels
(A, B, and C) in the 12 tasks.
Procedure
In economics and psychology classes, undergrad-
uates were asked to complete a questionnaire
about decision making and fairness. Participants
were informed that they would be paid SEK
50 (approximately US$6.5) if they agreed to
A B C
SEK per year and employee
in your group
3500 3190 2925
SEK per year and employee
in the other group
3000 3450 2925
A B
SEK per year and employee
in your group
3500 _____
SEK per year and employee
in the other group
3000 3450
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participate and that they were guaranteed anonym-
ity. Those who agreed to participate completed the
questionnaire individually immediately after class.
After contact had been made with the different
companies’ staff managers by the experimenter,
employees were asked to complete a questionnaire
about decision making and fairness. They received
the same information regarding payment and
anonymity as did the undergraduates. Employees
who agreed to participate completed the ques-
tionnaire individually at their work place in groups
ranging from 5–15 in size. The employees were
recruited from a representative sample of organi-
zations in the private sector in the large municipal
district of Go¨teborg, Sweden.
All questionnaires were handed out in rando-
mized order. Thus, participants were randomly
assigned to one condition in the 2 (Group) 6 2
(Comparison) factorial design. Completing the
questionnaire required about 30 minutes, after
which participants were paid and debriefed.
RESULTS
Six participants (two male and one female
psychology undergraduates, one female business
school undergraduate, and one male and one
female employee) failed to complete the question-
naire properly. They were therefore excluded from
the data analyses. With regard to sex and
participant group (i.e., psychology, business
school, and employees), the remaining 184 parti-
cipants were roughly equally balanced between the
experimental conditions: of the psychology under-
graduates, 9 were in the out-group/temporal
comparison condition, 12 in the out-group/social
comparison condition, 10 in the in-group/temporal
comparison condition, and 12 in the in-group/social
comparison condition. The corresponding figures
for the business school undergraduates were 12/12/
12/12, and for the employees, 22/23/24/24.
Initial analyses were performed with sex (male
vs female), participant group (psychology under-
graduates vs business school undergraduates vs
employees), and response order (fairness ratings
before preference ratings vs fairness ratings after
preference ratings) as independent variables. These
factors had no effects on participants’ choices.
They were therefore excluded from the reported
data analyses.
Participants made a total of 24 choice responses;
12 of the fairest and the remaining 12 of the best of
the three different allocations (A, B, and C). The
mean number of times each of the allocations was
chosen as the fairest and as the best allocation,
respectively, related to the between-subjects fac-
tors group and comparison are provided in Table 1.
Means were submitted to a 2 (Group: in-group vs
out-group) 6 2 (Comparison: social vs temporal)
6 2 (Evaluation Dimension: best alternative vs
fairest alternative) 6 3 (Allocation: own-best vs
maximization vs equality) ANOVA with repeated
measures on the last two factors.
The main effect of allocation was significant,
F(2, 360) 5 51.39, p,.001, gp
2 5 .22. This effect
indicated that equality (M5 11.40) was overall the
most chosen allocation, followed by maximization
(M 5 8.10) and own-best (M 5 3.54). Bonferroni-
corrected t-tests at p 5 .05 revealed that all mean
comparisons were significant. The Allocation 6
Evaluation Dimension interaction was significant,
F(2, 360) 5 71.80, p,.001, gp
2 5 .28, and follow-
up Bonferroni-corrected t-tests at p 5 .05 indi-
cated, in line with H1a, that equality (M 5 7.50)
was chosen more often than maximization (M 5
3.00) or own-best (M 5 1.15) when participants
TABLE 1
Mean number of times the allocations were chosen as related to evaluation dimension, group, and comparison
Group Comparison
Allocationa and evaluation dimension
Own-best Maximization Equality
Fairest Best Fairest Best Fairest Best
In-group Social M 1.04 3.50 0.94 3.88 9.88 4.50
(SD) (2.29) (4.42) (2.29) (4.66) (3.23) (4.37)
Temporal M 1.18 2.11 5.18 6.98 4.98 2.35
(SD) (2.69) (4.08) (4.74) (4.39) (4.72) (3.42)
Out-
group
Social M 1.08 2.89 0.30 2.81 10.60 6.15
(SD) (1.93) (3.50) (0.75) (4.10) (2.15) (4.57)
Temporal M 1.29 0.91 5.56 7.32 4.55 2.05
(SD) (2.66) (2.38) (4.85) (4.91) (4.38) (3.46)
a Due to the between-subjects factors group and comparison, the labelling of the own-best allocation is somewhat misleading. Still, for
participants, the allocations were only referred to as A, B, or C.
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chose the fairest allocation. They also indicated, in
line with H1b, that maximization (M 5 5.25) was
chosen more often than equality (M 5 3.76) or
own-best (M 5 2.35) when participants chose the
best allocation.
The Allocation 6 Comparison interaction was
significant, F(2, 360) 5 62.52, p,.001, gp
2 5 .26,
and follow-up Bonferroni-corrected t-tests at p 5
.05 indicated, in line with H2a, that equality (M 5
7.78) was chosen more often than maximization
(M 5 1.98) or own-best (M 5 2.13) when social
comparisons were made; in line with H2b they
indicated that maximization (M 5 6.26) was
chosen more often than equality (M 5 3.48) or
own-best (M 5 1.37) when temporal comparisons
were made. The Allocation 6 Comparison 6
Evaluation Dimension interaction, F(2, 360) 5
8.59, p,.001, gp
2 5 .05, indicated that the
preferred rating of equality as the fairest allocation
was particularly the case for a social comparison
context, whereas the preferred rating of maximiza-
tion as the best allocation was particularly the case
for temporal comparisons.
H3a and H3b predicted a significant four-way
interaction of Group 6 Evaluation Dimension 6
Allocation 6 Comparison. However, this interac-
tion effect was not significant, F(2, 360) 5 0.19, p
5 .828, gp
2 5 .00. Thus, the hypothesis that the
own-best allocation would be chosen as the best
allocation due to a motive based on self-interest in
the in-group/social comparison condition (H3a)
was not supported. Still, H3a was indirectly
supported in that Bonferroni-corrected paired
samples t-tests at p 5 .05 indicated that partici-
pants in the in-group/social comparison group,
when choosing the best allocation, did not
distinguish between the three allocations. In
contrast, and in line with H3b, for participants in
the out-group/social comparison condition, equal-
ity was significantly more preferred than the other
allocations.
DISCUSSION
Equality was the most frequently chosen alloca-
tion overall. This is worth noting given that
equality was always deficient to the other alloca-
tions. Participants thus preferred less money for all
parties to unequal allocations of more money.
Obviously, equal outcomes appeal to people. In
line with our focal argument, equality was the only
allocation that was chosen more often as the
fairest allocation than as the best allocation. The
large discrepancy between equality as the fairest
and as the best allocation clearly indicates that
equality seems to appeal to people’s conceptions of
fairness, whereas choices of the other two alloca-
tions seem to be driven to a higher extent by other
motives, such as rationality (maximization) or self-
interest (own-best). In contrast to the view of
equality as a heuristic (e.g., Allison & Messick,
1990; Harris & Joyce, 1980; Messick & Schell,
1992), but in line with research by Van Dijk and
Wilke (1995), people regard equality as fair, and
they are entrapped by being fair (cf. Eek &
Ga¨rling, in press).
As expected, choices of equality were moderated
by the nature of comparison. Thus, in line with
H2a, in groups where social comparisons were
made, equality was chosen more often than in
groups where temporal comparisons were made.
This supports our notion that relevant compar-
isons are needed for fairness considerations to
affect behaviour. Equality was certainly perceived
as the fairest allocations, which supported H1a.
Again, in groups where social comparisons were
made, the difference between equality as the best
and as the fairest allocation was largest. Thus, the
results demonstrate that equality will most likely
be chosen as the allocation principle when it is a
matter of evaluations on the fairness dimension
and when social comparisons are made.
The clear disadvantage of choosing equality in
the present tasks was that the alternative alloca-
tions maximization and own-best provided more
money. Both parties in the allocation tasks would
have been better off if a principle other than
equality had been chosen. The results showed that
maximization was perceived as the best allocation
that verified hypothesis H1b. More importantly,
though, maximization was chosen more often as
the best than as the fairest allocation. Again, there
were effects of the nature of comparison. As
expected in H2b, participants in groups where
temporal comparisons were made chose maximi-
zation more often than participants in the other
groups. For participants in the temporal compar-
isons groups, there was no conflict between being
fair and getting the most. Thus, what is fair is far
more difficult to grasp in temporal comparisons
than in social comparisons.
The own-best allocation was, in H3a, expected
to appeal to a selfish motive among participants in
the in-group/social comparison condition. Thus,
this group was the only one that could actually act
on the basis of a selfish motive. Even though the
own-best and the maximization allocations had
been matched as equally attractive by other
participants in the same context, the own-best
allocation maximized the own group’s outcome,
which was only relevant for participants in the
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in-group/social comparison condition. However,
the hypothesis was not supported. Still, partici-
pants in the in-group/social comparison condition,
as opposed to participants in the out-group/social
comparison condition, did not choose equality as
the best allocation. This lower preference for
equality may point at a selfish component,
although not as clearly as hypothesized.
The finding that equality was chosen more often
as the fairest allocation than as the best one is
important since it contradicts the arguments put
forward by Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996), who
argued for the legitimacy of equating evaluations
of fairness and evaluations of preference in
outcome decisions. Based on arguments in equity
theory, revealing high correlations between pre-
ference and fairness in judgments, they concluded
that the focus could reasonably be set on the
convergence rather than on the divergence
between preference judgments and fairness judg-
ments. Other researchers have, in the same way,
either deliberately or accidentally, treated fairness
and preference in outcome evaluations as identical
(see Van den Bos et al., 1998, for an overview).
However, we believe that the size of this con-
ceptual overlap may vary with conditions, with
divergence dominating convergence in some situa-
tions. Therefore, it may be wise to keep the two
dimensions of evaluations separated. This argu-
ment is further supported by research on the
connection between people’s fairness conceptions
and their behaviour in social dilemmas. As
reviewed by Eek and Biel (2003), when people
estimate how high a fair level of cooperation is,
and thereafter decide to what extent they prefer to
cooperate, the correlations between fairness and
behaviour are very high. However, when the two
responses are separated in time, the correlations
decline drastically (Biel & Eek, 2005).
The finding that social comparisons increase
choices of equality was expected, since it goes in
line with proposals and experimental results in
previous research (Messick & Sentis, 1983; Selart
& Eek, 2005; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992). An
explanation of this phenomenon has to point to
some particular causes. For instance, situations in
which social comparisons are made demand
different considerations from situations in which
temporal comparisons are made. Social compar-
isons bring into play a norm prescribing an
appropriate behaviour, and the central norm in
resource allocation tasks seems to be equality. A
reasonable explanation to the central position of
the equality principle when social comparisons are
made could be its conflict-avoiding potential
(Diekman et al., 1997; Messick & Sentis, 1985).
Thus, an equal allocation does not surface and
evaluate individual differences in, for instance,
social status. Moreover, it is perhaps the peace-
promoting potential in equal allocations that
explains the use of equality as a heuristic and
anchor in social contexts. In contrast, for groups
where temporal comparisons were made, partici-
pants considered maximization as the best and
fairest allocation. A situation without social
comparisons does not evoke a norm of equality,
probably because equality here has no ‘‘social’’
function. In such situations there is more room for
other considerations, such as the goal of maximiz-
ing overall outcomes or one’s own outcome
(Deutsch, 1975, 1985; Thompson & Loewenstein,
1992).
One strength of the present study was that both
undergraduates and employees from various orga-
nizations and companies were recruited as parti-
cipants. Even though we used scenarios that did
not necessarily mirror employees’ real working
life, the employees completed the task in their
everyday work environment. No differences were
found between the two groups. Before any strong
and causal implications can be drawn, it is of
course desirable to replicate results from studies
using scenarios with studies using other experi-
mental methods. With this in mind, we still believe
that it is promising that the two sample groups did
not differ, since it shows that important questions
in organizational contexts can be studied experi-
mentally with undergraduates as participants
without committing serious violations to the
external validity.
Future research should further explore defini-
tions and categorizations of evaluation dimensions
in outcome evaluations, and under what condi-
tions these dimensions converge and diverge.
Further research is also clearly needed on how
the adoption of different principles for resource
allocation is influenced by individual differences
such as social value orientations, and situational
factors such as, for instance, group goals. Recent
studies by Kazemi and Eek (2007) show that
people may choose allocation principles that they
do not necessarily perceive as fair, just as long as
they believe that the principles are instrumental in
achieving given group goals (e.g., economic
productivity). Furthermore, in Kazemi et al.
(2005b), selfish motives seem to be downplayed
by group goals. In organizational settings, such
results, in conjunction with the results of the
present study, can help to explain why different
work groups choose different principles for
allocating their outcomes (cf. Mannix et al.,
1995). For instance, in a work group where
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rewards and bonuses are given in relation to
present and expected future performance (i.e., a
temporal comparison), a different allocation prin-
ciple will probably be chosen from that in a work
group where bonuses are given in relation to the
group members’ different levels of performance
(i.e., a social comparison).
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